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Introduction 
In the early post-Cold War era, space opened-up for renewed Turkish interest in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA), and Central Asia – regions in which the Ottoman Empire, as the predecessor to 
the modern Turkish Republic, had played a pivotal role. Through the 1990s and early 2000s Turkey’s 
political, economic and socio-cultural links with the MENA, in particular, rapidly expanded. Whereas 
through the 1900s Ankara had looked westwards to Europe and did not pay significant attention to its 
neighbours to the south and east (outside of security interests), Turkey has 'rediscovered’ the MENA 
and now plays a very significant role in the region’s political and economic affairs. A body of literature 
has emerged that explores the emergence of these expanding ties and the policy interests driving 
them (see, for example: Öniş 2010; Kardaş 2010; Kirisci and Kaptanoglu 2011; Hürsoy 2013;). It is 
timely to deepen our understanding of the ways in which Turkey has not only reengaged with the 
MENA but has more fully integrated with it. Turkey now plays an important role in the region’s political 
and economic system in a number of ways. This chapter explores this new reality by analysing the 
political economy of Turkey’s relations with MENA partners.  
According to Ziya Öniş and Mustafa Kutlay (2013, 1412) ‘[t]he current proactivism in Turkish 
foreign policy […] increasingly relies on two pillars: economic interdependence, and explicit pro-
democracy rhetoric.’ It is the first of these two pillars that is the focus of this chapter. Levent Aydin 
and Mustafa Acar (2013, 42) highlights that there is ‘[n]o doubt that the greater Middle East […] 
capture[s] more attention now in the new Turkish foreign policy as opposed to the past.’ And that 
‘[c]hanging patterns or direction in Turkey’s foreign trade could be taken as one of the indicators’ of 
this shift in Turkey’s foreign economic policy. Understanding these changing patterns in its economic 
interactions with the MENA will allow us to better understand the extent to which Turkey is integrating 
with its neighbours to the south and east, and whether this integration is symmetrical or asymmetrical 
– which will largely determine whether Turkey is an emerging regional hegemon, or simply a key part 
of a broader regional market. This chapter explores these issues by analysing several aspects of 
Turkey’s economic interactions with states in the broader MENA in terms of commercial institutions, 
trade volumes and balance, foreign direct investment (FDI), and the role of Turkish corporations.   
This chapter employs a mixed-method approach that favours quantitative analysis of macro-
economic linkages between Turkey and the MENA, and qualitative analysis of the interests and 
discourse informing institutional interactions. We will first consider the ways in which the political 
economy of Turkey’s integration into the MENA regional economy has been framed. Then we will 
explore Turkey-MENA trade and FDI patterns and structures. The importance of Turkish corporations 
will be highlighted before conclusions are drawn about the importance and longevity of Turkey’s 
integration with the region.  
 
Conceptualising Turkey-MENA Economic Integration 
There is some validity to the claim that in the historical context, the abolishment of the Caliphate and 
Ottoman dynasty cut ties and ‘breached the “social contract” between Kurds, Arabs and Turks’ 
(Ehteshami and Elik 2011, 644). The leading view now is that ‘[a] major structural transformation in 
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Turkish central-periphery relations occurred when the Justice and Development Party […] won 
parliamentary elections in November 2002. The nature of Turkey’s policy toward the Middle East 
changed under the banner of new activism in Turkish foreign policy’ (Ibid., 645-646). However, it can 
also be argued that ‘[t]his characterization is an injustice to the continuation in Turkey’s relations with 
the region’ (Ibid.). Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, Turkey’s economic relations with the 
MENA (in particular, trade and FDI, and the roles that Turkish corporations play) has deepened since 
the early 2000s and in many ways has repositioned Turkey in the broader MENA market. Some 
scholars (see: Pollack 2005; Cagaptay 2009) state that Turkey’s supposed ‘Eastern Turn’ has been 
driven by the AKP’s Islamist agenda, while others (see: Kirisci 2009, 2011; Logan 2009) claim that 
changes in Turkey’s domestic and foreign economic relations have transformed Turkey into a ‘trading 
state’ and there is nothing unique about Turkey’s economic integration with the MENA. Thus, Turkey’s 
‘foreign policy is guided to a greater extent by economic considerations such as trade, export markets, 
[FDI], and energy security’ (Ekmekci and Yildirim 2013, 53). Kirisci (2011, 33-34) claims that ‘economic 
considerations such as the need to trade, expand exports, and attract and export [FDI]’ have replaced 
narrow security considerations as the main drivers behind Turkey’s foreign policy-making. While 
Ekmeci and Yildirim (2013, 58) find that Turkey’s economics-first approach has in some ways 
necessitated the ‘maintenance of good neighbourly relations with countries in the [MENA]’. In other 
words, Turkey’s economic interests now heavily influence its broader foreign interests rather than the 
other way around as in the past. Furthermore, Turkey has largely followed a neo-functionalist 
framework in order to maximise gains from both the economic opportunities that the MENA market 
represents, and the interdependence that accompanies greater levels of trade and FDI. This has 
allowed Turkey to institutionalise its relations with MENA states by ‘downgrading military power in 
favor of economic interactions’ (Kutlay 2011, 71).  
Ageliki and Ioannis (2016, 285) find that ‘Turkey’s trade integration in the world system is […] 
balanced while, at the same time, Turkey seems to develop intensive trade relations with specific 
subsystems in [the] Eurasian region based on geographical (in a broader geopolitical sense), cultural 
and historical proximities.’ This is in contrast to the Interwar and Cold War eras when Turkey’s political 
and economic strategies toward the MENA were perceived by its neighbours, in particular Arab states, 
as founded on the need to balance extra-regional and regional actors and not as a sign that Turkey 
sought to become the regional hegemon (Ehteshami and Elik 2011, 646). This perception of Turkey as 
a balancing rather than aggressive actor in the region has merit when considering the changes taking 
place within Turkey’s domestic political economy. In the early 2000s a ‘power shift in domestic finance 
capital underpinned an active foreign policy engagement’ (Kutlay 2011, 75). The increased power and 
influence of the Anatolian Tigers in this period helped to change the economic structures informing 
power relations within Turkey which ‘inevitably spilled-over into foreign policy’ (Ibid.). The rise of the 
Anatolian Tigers allowed the emergent Anatolian bourgeoisie to have a greater say in where Turkey 
looked for both inspiration and for opportunities to exploit. Thanks to ‘geographical proximity and 
cultural factors’ Turkish policy-makers were encouraged to reformulate their policies towards both 
the MENA and Central Asia (Ibid., 76). In effect, Turkey began to look east and south, finding economic, 
political and socio-cultural opportunities to expand its role in the global political economy.  
We can identify three sets of structures that have informed the manner in which this 
deepening of Turkey’s role in the MENA (what we can term its reintegration into the region – at least 
in terms of its economic relations) has taken place. Firstly, we can consider material interests. ‘The 
material interests established between Turkish firms and neighbouring countries’ are a clear 
demonstration of the integrative relationships that underpin Turkey’s foreign policy activism since the 
AKP assumed power in 2002. Mustafa Kutlay refers to the economic and personal interactions 
between Turkish businesspersons and their counterparts from other MENA states as one of the 
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practical hands of Turkey’s diplomacy (Ibid., 77-78). The second key structure is the multiple dialogue 
channels that originate in the business realm, but which have spilled-over (in the rather classical 
functionalist sense) into other areas of Turkey’s state and market interactions with MENA actors. ‘The 
increasing intensity of commercial relationships between Anatolian businessmen and [MENA] markets 
has created spill-over effects and facilitated the establishing of new dialogue and cooperation 
mechanisms’ (Ibid., 80). Furthermore, the deepening of economic links between Turkey and its MENA 
neighbours has a significant impact on the broader relationship between Turkey and the region, as 
‘relationships are not restricted to bureaucratic state-state relations anymore. The interaction 
between non-state actors at different levels and on different issue areas has multiplied the ways in 
which parties gather information about each other’ (Ibid., 81). The third way in which Turkey’s 
reintegration into the MENA market has been shaped are the perceptions of Turkey’s roles and 
interests by other MENA actors. Kutlay concludes that ‘the spill-over effects of commercial interests 
and the institutionalization of multiple dialogue channels in new relationships [have] gradually 
change[d] perceptions’ (Ibid.). In particular, Arab perceptions of Turkey have changed since the early 
2000s, with surveys finding that a majority (approximately 75%) of the Arab population now view 
Turkey either very positively or positively. We should not underestimate the role of Turkey’s economic 
interactions with the region here. Increasing economic interdependence has encouraged more 
intense ‘interaction and human mobility that [has] changed the historically and ideologically loaded 
(mis)perceptions’ (Ibid., 81-82) of communities in Turkey and the Arab world.   
Economic interactions between Turkey and the MENA should also be considered in the 
broader context of Turkey’s position on the world stage. Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Suleyman Elik 
(2011, 646) argue that Turkey has aspirations in the global political economy that extend well beyond 
its roles in the MENA and Central Asia. ‘Turkey sees the Middle East as a key strategic region in the 
global power struggle, in addition to its concerns over access to the region’s gas and oil resources.’ 
Specifically, they suggest that Turkey’s reintegration with the MENA as a whole, and with Iran and the 
larger Arab states in particular, has become ‘a function of Ankara’s application of its soft power, which 
includes broad economic engagement and deepening ties in the energy sector’ (Ibid., 657-658). 
Although Turkey remains economically connected to Europe, North America, and South and East Asia, 
by integrating with the MENA, it has been able to increase its relative economic power and political 
importance on the world stage (Kirisci et al. 2010) and offset some of its reliance on Western markets 
– which come with political considerations that hinder Turkey’s ability to pursue its broader foreign 
policy goals (Sorhun 2013, 22). This reorientation of Turkey’s overarching foreign policy strategy and 
its involvement in the MENA, in particular, date back to at least the 2002 electoral success of the AKP 
(Öniş and Yilmaz 2009). Englin Sorhun (2013, 22) highlights, however, that the MENA does not 
represent a panacea for Turkey’s weaknesses. ‘The Arab Spring has been jeopardizing Turkish export 
market[s] and this has a possibility of breaking down the recent development in trade flows. Moreover, 
political instability, the risk of war, worsened economic situation, [and] slowing reform process 
resulting from awakening movements seem to be the signs that the impacts of the Arab Spring on 
trade flows can last longer.’  
The limitations of relying on economic integration with the MENA to help Turkey develop 
greater leverage in its broader international relations also informs the move away from its long-
standing strategic policy of ‘zero problems with neighbours’ (ZPN) that was dominant in the early 
2000s. Turkey attempted to ‘develop relations with [the] Arab world as a trade partner at the 
beginning of the 1990s [but] it did not last long. Trade volume with Arab countries remained below 
[their] potential level until the implementation of the [ZPN] policy’ in 2002 (Ibid., 23). The most 
obvious macro-economic impact of the ZPN was that Turkey ‘diversified its export markets especially 
with the members of the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) [this] market diversification 
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alleviated the dependence of Turkey on [the] European export market’ (Ibid., 25) and made it less 
vulnerable to the global economic recession that followed the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Yet, while 
economic interactions between Turkey and the MENA have dramatically increased (as demonstrated 
below) since 2002, Turkey has been unable to insulate itself from the upheavals of the Arab Spring in 
2010-2011 (note that Turkey was very active in the region prior to 2010 (Kardas 2010)) and the post-
Arab Spring instability experienced by many states in the region. It has been one of the most actively 
engaged external actors in Syria’s civil war, for example, and this has undermined its relations with 
leading international powers as well as the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. Some now argue that 
the ZPN policy was drastically undermined, or even purposefully changed post-2011 into a ‘zero 
friends policy’ (Subasat 2017, 1). Regardless of the post-2011 changes in Turkey’s security relations 
with the MENA, previous work to institutionalise its political and economic relations with Iran and the 
Arab states has embedded and formed a framework that looks may facilitate greater economic 
interdependence over the coming years. We now turn to an overview of the main institutional 
mechanisms and Turkey’s trade relations with the region.  
 
Turkey’s Bilateral Trade with MENA States 
The post-2002 expansion of Turkey’s foreign trade and its integration with the regional economy in 
the MENA are part of a longer-term and somewhat deep-rooted restructuring of the Turkish economy 
along neo-liberal lines that dates back to the 1980s (see: Donmez and Zemandl 2019; Öniş and Senses 
2009). Europe remains the most important single regional market for Turkey (both in terms of imports 
and exports) and the Turkey-EU Customs Union Agreement (in force since 1995) reflects this fact. 
Turkey has also pursued (with some vigour) greater institutionalisation of its trade relations with the 
global economy (Turkey was a member of GATT since 1951 and a subsequent founding member of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995) and the MENA. Turkey is a member of a number of 
commercial institutions, including: a free trade agreement (FTA) with the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan); the European Free Trade Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland); and bilateral FTAs with: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Croatia, Egypt, Georgia, 
Israel, Jordan (at the time of writing this FTA was being re-negotiated), Macedonia, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Palestine, Serbia, Singapore, South Korea, Syria 
(suspended at the time of writing) and Tunisia. While the effectiveness of commercial institutions on 
creating trade and promoting political cooperation (read: peace and stability in international relations) 
is still debated (see: Oneal and Russett 1999; Polachek et al. 1999; Aydin 2010; Barbieri 1996; El-Anis 
2018), it is clear that the Turkish government has sought to institutionalise its economic integration 
with the global economy. Ankara wants either to facilitate trade and deepen economic integration or 
to promote channels for political dialogue (or both) and the MENA and Central Asia feature quite 
prominently here with 16 of Turkey’s 35 FTA partners being in these regions.  
Turkey’s over-arching foreign economic policies appear to have significantly influenced both 
the country’s position in the global economy and its economic integration with states both near and 
far. Turkey has now become deeply integrated into the world economy as its 14th largest national 
market by purchasing power ($2.173 trillion (Wold Bank, 2018)) and an outward-oriented trading state 
– albeit one with significant imports too. A survey of Turkey’s trading partners demonstrates the 
deepening level of global integration that the Turkish economy has achieved in the past two decades 
or so, and the increasing importance of the MENA market for Turkey. Its leading trade partners are 
located across different regions (see Table 1). Perhaps unsurprisingly, given their historical and 
contemporary political and socio-cultural connections, Turkey’s leading trade partner remains 
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Germany with bilateral trade totalling $35.474 billion in 2016. Turkey exports more goods and services 
to Germany than anywhere else ($13.999 billion in 2016, equivalent to 9.82% of all Turkish exports), 
but it also imports more from Germany ($21.475 billion, 10.8% of all imports) than anywhere else 
except China. This means that the 2016 balance of trade favoured Germany by $7.476 billion (this is 
Turkey’s third largest trade deficit with any individual trade partner). As is the case for many states, 
China is also a key trading partner for Turkey and bilateral trade in 2016 totalled $27.77 billion, with 
imports from China amounting to $25.441 billion, equivalent to 12.8% of Turkey’s total imports that 
year, which is good enough to be Turkey’s largest source of imports. At the same time, however, 
Turkish exports to China are quite limited, totalling only $2.328 billion in 2016, equivalent to 1.63% of 
Turkey’s exports, and leading to Turkey’s largest trade deficit with any single state ($23.113 billion in 
2016). The rest of Turkey’s top 20 trading partners demonstrate Turkey’s advanced trading links with 
Europe,2 North America,3  Asia,4  and the MENA.5  
 Interestingly out of Turkey’s top trading partners, only four are from the MENA. However, Iran, 
the UAE, Iraq and Saudi Arabia together did represent over $32 billion in total trade for Turkey in 2016, 
and importantly Turkey has trade surpluses with each of them. Turkey’s total trade with Iran is larger 
than with any other MENA state at $9.665 billion in 2016, and while it had a trade surplus of only 
$266.4 million, Iran represents Turkey’s largest imports market in the region ($4.7 billion in imports in 
2016, equivalent to 2.37% of total imports that year). Turkey exports more to Iraq ($7.637 billion in 
2016, equivalent to 5.36% of total exports) than to any other MENA state, yet it only imported $836.3 
million of goods and services in that year (0.4% of imports), leading to a trade surplus of $6.8 billion, 
its largest with a MENA state in 2016. Turkish-Emirati bilateral trade is the second largest for Turkey 
in the region at $9.1 billion in 2016 and with $5.41 billion accounted for by Turkish exports (3.79% of 
all exports) and $3.7 billion in imports (1.86% of all imports) leading to a Turkish trade surplus of $1.7 
billion that year. Turkish-Saudi trade expresses a similar structure but albeit of lower monetary values. 
Turkey exported $2.68 billion in goods and services to Saudi Arabia in 2016 (2.23% of total exports) 
and imported a further $1.835 billion (0.92% of total imports) leading to a trade surplus of $1.337 
billion.  
 
Table 1. Turkey’s Trade with Leading Partners, 2016 (US$ billions) 
State Exports  Exports 
(% of 
Total) 
Imports  Imports 
(% of 
Total) 
Trade 
Balance  
Total Trade 
Volume  
Germany 13.999 9.82 21.475 10.8 -7.476 35.474 
China 2.328 1.63 25.441 12.8 -23.113 27.77 
Italy 7.581 5.32 10.218 5.14 -2.638 17.799 
United 
States 6.624 4.65 10.868 5.47 -4.244 17.492 
United 
Kingdom 11.686 8.2 5.320 2.68 6.366 17.006 
                                                            
2 Italy, 3rd; the UK, 5th; Russia, 6th; France, 7th; Spain, 8th; the Netherlands, 13th; Poland, 15th; Belgium, 
16th; Switzerland, 17th; Romania, 19th and Bulgaria, 20th.  
3 The USA, 4th.  
4 India, 14th.  
5 Iran, 9th; the UAE, 10th; Iraq, 11th; Saudi Arabia, 18th. 
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Russia 1.733 1.22 15.162 7.63 -13.429 16.895 
France 6.026 4.23 7.365 3.71 -1.339 13.391 
Spain 4.989 3.5 5.679 2.86 -0.690 10.668 
Iran 4.966 3.48 4.7 2.37 0.267 9.666 
UAE 5.407 3.79 3.701 1.86 1.706 9.108 
Iraq 7.637 5.36 0.836 0.421 6.8 8.473 
South Korea 0.519 0.364 6.384 3.21 -5.866 6.903 
Netherlands 3.589 2.52 3 1.51 0.589 6.59 
India 0.652 0.457 5.757 2.9 -5.106 6.409 
Poland 2.651 1.86 3.244 1.63 -0.594 5.895 
Belgium 2.548 1.79 3.2 1.61 -0.653 5.749 
Switzerland 2.681 1.88 2.506 1.26 0.175 5.187 
Saudi Arabia 3.172 2.23 1.835 0.924 1.337 5.007 
Romania 2.671 1.87 2.196 1.11 0.476 4.867 
Bulgaria 2.384 1.67 2.143 1.08 0.241 4.526 
Source: World Bank, 2018.  
 
Turkey’s MENA trade structure is relatively unique in terms of the trade surpluses it generates. 
Out of its top 20 trading partners, Turkey has a trade deficit with 11 (all but one of which are more 
advanced economies in Europe, Asia and North America). The MENA allows Turkey to offset some of 
these deficits. In fact, in 2016 Turkey did not have a single trade deficit with any state in the MENA. 
While some trade surpluses were not large in comparison to some of Turkey’s other trading partners 
in Europe, North America and Asia, Turkey’s combined trade surplus with MENA states meant that a 
balance of $20.5 billion flowed into Turkey from the rest of the MENA (see Table 2). This is a significant 
annual surplus and is all the more important given that Turkey-MENA exports accounted for almost 
26% of Turkey’s total exports in 2016. At the same time, though, one can question the depth of 
Turkish-MENA economic integration because of this trade imbalance and the limited amount of 
Turkish imports from the region which accounted for only 8.3% of total Turkish imports in 2016 (or 
perhaps it is more a case of Turkish consumers lacking interest in MENA products and services). 
However, a consideration of the changes witnessed in Turkey-MENA trade over the past two decades 
or so does offer some relevant insights into how important this trade is becoming for Turkey.  
 
Table 2. Turkey’s Trade with MENA Partners, 2016 (US$ billions) 
State Exports  Exports (% 
of Total) 
Imports  Imports (% 
of Total) 
Trade 
Balance  
Total Trade 
Volume  
Iran 4.966 3.48 4.67 2.37 0.266 9.666 
UAE 5.407 3.79 3.701 1.86 1.706 9.108 
Iraq 7.637 5.36 0.836 0.421 6.8 8.473 
Saudi 
Arabia 3.172 2.23 1.835 0.924 1.337 5.007 
Israel 2.956 2.07 1.386 0.698 1.57 4.341 
Egypt 2.733 1.92 1.443 0.727 1.29 4.176 
Morocco 1.469 1.03 0.918 0.462 0.551 2.387 
Algeria 1.736 1.22 0.461 0.234 1.273 2.2 
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Syria 1.322 0.928 0.65 0.0329 1.257 1.387 
Tunisia 0.911 0.639 0.214 0.108 0.696 1.125 
Libya 0.906 0.636 0.161 0.0811 0.745 1.067 
Lebanon 0.735 0.515 0.82 0.0412 0.653 0.817 
Jordan 0.711 0.499 0.102 0.0515 0.609 0.813 
Qatar 0.439 0.308 0.271 0.136 0.168 0.71 
Kuwait 0.431 0.303 0.11 0.0557 0.321 0.542 
Yemen 0.536 0.376 0 0 0.536 0.536 
Sudan 0.461 0.323 0.05 0.025 0.411 0.51 
Bahrain 0.193 0.136 0.128 0.0643 0.066 0.321 
Oman 0.244 0.171 0.049 0.0247 0.195 0.293 
Mauritania 0.073 0.0514 0.015 0.00762 0.058 0.088 
Source: World Bank, 2018.  
 
Through the mid- to late-1990s Turkey’s total trade with the MENA remained limited, 
generally around $8 billion a year and never exceeding $10 billion (see Table 2). This trade also 
remained largely constant with little sign of increasing interaction even though the MENA market did 
expand quite significantly during this decade. There was a clear economic transformation, however, 
after 2002 when there was a dramatic and rapid increase in Tukey’s bilateral trade with MENA states. 
We cannot be entirely certain about whether or not this increase resulted from the AKP coming into 
power, and its subsequent policies aimed at institutionalised economic integration with the region as 
discussed above, but the coincidence is significant. It is possible that the AKP decision-makers at the 
time had identified emerging patterns of economic interaction with MENA states and sort to facilitate 
these. Either way, Turkey-MENA trade through the 2000s grew exponentially, reaching almost $45 
billion in 2008 until declining to $33.6 billion in 2009, which was largely caused by the global financial 
crisis and recession of 2008-2009, which negatively affected Turkey’s overall foreign trade and not just 
that with the MENA. By 2010, Turkey’s trade with the region once again began to grow rapidly 
reaching $71.8 billion in 2012 until a slowdown and decline from 2013 ($66.9 billion) to 2016 ($53.7 
billion). This latter period coincides with significant regional turmoil that has negatively affected the 
region’s market as a whole. This turmoil includes the following: the worsening of the Syrian civil war 
and its internationalisation, with Russian, US, Saudi Arabian, Iranian and Turkish involvement, in 
particular, deepening; the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq and the subsequent conflict to defeat it; 
increased tension between Iran and its Arab neighbours; the Saudi-led coalition’s involvement in 
Yemen’s civil war; and deteriorating relations between Qatar and its GCC and broader Arab neighbours. 
Regardless of these periods of decline in 2009 and 2013-2015, Turkey-MENA trade has grown by 
approximately 900% since 2002, a very dramatic increase given the lack of growth in the pre-2002 era.  
 
Figure 1. Turkey's Trade Balance with MENA Partners, 2016 (US$ billions) 
8 
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2018. 
 
Interestingly, Turkey’s economic relationships with MENA states are not heavily affected by 
geographical proximity except for with Iran and Iraq, Turkey’s first and third largest trading partners. 
Syria ranks ninth out of the 20 MENA states considered here in terms of total trade with Turkey, 
although, of course, trade between these two states has been negatively impacted by Syria’s civil war. 
Beyond Turkey’s immediate neighbours the mix of key trading partners in the region becomes varied 
with the UAE (2nd), Saudi Arabia (4th), Israel (5th), and Egypt (6th) being somewhat close to Turkey. 
However, Turkey’s other main regional trade partners are not nearby: Morocco (7th), Algeria (8th), 
Tunisia (10th) and Libya (11th) account for the majority of Turkey’s remaining trade with the MENA. 
Proximity is less important in determining Turkey’s MENA trade than other variables including, the 
overall size of partners’ markets, trading partners’ levels of economic development, and the success 
of private sector actors (especially Turkish corporations operating in the region) in foreign markets. 
Turkey exports ‘finished goods to and imports raw materials and energy commodities from [Arab 
countries]. Raw materials and energy commodities are the only goods […] leading to production 
complementarity’ (Sorhun 2013, 26). Turkey trades more with the larger economies of the region and 
those that are more advanced.  
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Table 3. Turkey’s Total Trade with the MENA, 1996-2017 (US$ billions) 
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Source: Turkstat, 2018.
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Overall, the past decade and a half or so has seen Turkey’s economic interaction with the rest 
of the MENA expand rapidly and deepen. Total trade volume has increased so rapidly that economic 
integration has deepened drastically between Turkey and the region as a whole, even though Turkey 
has maintained an overall trade surplus. The make-up of Turkey’s trade with the region, however, has 
not led to Turkey’s economy becoming the central market in the region (the GCC states collectively 
still hold the most economically influential position) yet it has developed significant trade with all 
states considered here – something which other MENA states cannot claim to have managed to 
achieve. 
 
Figure 2. Turkey’s Total Trade with the MENA, 1996-2017 (US$ billions) 
 
Source: TurkStat (www.turkstat.gov.tr), 2018. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
The second pillar of economic integration is FDI. While trade in goods and services demonstrates 
economic integration in the form of production, exchange and consumption (important features that 
speak to the health and stability of national economies), perhaps more important in terms of signalling 
deep economic integration between states is FDI. Producers of goods and services will always seek to 
increase sales and profits and will do so by exploiting opportunities in any market where it is profitable 
to do so. Turkey’s trade with the MENA as discussed above, therefore, does not demonstrate 
significant trust and interest as much as it does profiteering. Investing capital (whether liquid or fixed) 
in foreign markets, on the other hand, does signal trust and interest – which are central to reinforcing 
economic integration and interdependence (see: Bearce 2003; Bearce and Omori 2005) – and can tie 
markets together.  
Capital flows in the form of FDI between Turkey and the MENA in the past two decades or so 
have been important but somewhat limited (totalling just over $14 billion). Interestingly, change in 
FDI flows does not mirror the overall trends in Turkey-MENA trade in goods and services since the 
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turn of the millennium. Prior to 2005, total FDI levels were insignificant and certainly far below what 
one might expect, although this began to change with overall growth in FDI levels. However, after 
2005, a period of notable annual increases followed by equally notable annual declines in bilateral FDI 
emerged (see Figure 3). The growth seen may have been linked to the rise of the AKP in 2002 and 
subsequent macro-economic policy changes, although further research is needed to verify this 
hypothesis. Total FDI stood at $1.7 billion in 2005, increased slightly the following year to just under 
$2 billion, but then declined rapidly in 2007 to $713 million. Even as the global financial crisis began 
to bite in 2008 FDI rapidly increased to $2.6 billion but then dropped to $397 million in 2009 (the 
second lowest level since 2005). The impact of the global downturn lingered in the MENA as whole, 
as it did elsewhere around the world, and negatively impacted the Turkish economy more than most 
other large economies in the region. This may help explain the poor performance of Turkey-MENA FDI 
between 2009-2011. The Arab Spring did not hinder FDI in 2012 ($1.4 billion) and 2013 ($1.6 billion) 
but the intensification of the regional instability best demonstrated by the Syrian civil war, as well as 
the increasing centralisation of power in Ankara suppressed FDI since 2014 with 2017 seeing only $448 
million in bilateral FDI between Turkey and MENA states.  
Even though total FDI levels have not been high or even constant over the past decade or 
more, importantly, Turkey has maintained an overall FDI surplus with the region in each year as FDI 
inflows to Turkey outstripped net outflows. Furthermore, these surpluses were significant in 2005 
($1.7 billion), 2006 ($1.9 billion), 2008 ($1.9 billion), 2012 ($1.1 billion) and 2013 ($1.6 billion) 
representing a source of external income that has helped to slightly offset Turkey’s unfavourable 
terms of trade with its main economic partners in Europe, North America and Asia. Turkey’s smallest 
surplus came in 2017 with a mostly insignificant $10 million. This overall surplus demonstrates the 
relative attractiveness of the Turkish market for MENA investors and the relative lack of trust and 
interest that Turkish investors have in MENA markets. It is also an indicator of the inward orientation 
of Turkish investors who have had success at home during a period of solid economic growth since 
2002. Yet, while trade levels recovered and continued the high annual growth rates seen before the 
2008-2009 global financial crisis, the stagnation of FDI levels suggests there are structural limitations 
to Turkey’s economic reintegration with the region. This could signal that both state and non-state 
actors in the MENA have struggled to raise capital for investment abroad, or that Turkey’s economy 
offers limited incentives for foreign capital (or both). Of course, the aftermath of the 2016 coup 
attempt in Turkey has led to a stiffening of AKP policies, including greater scrutiny of foreign capital 
ventures and this could well discourage FDI inflows from the MENA and elsewhere.  
 
Figure 3. Turkey's FDI Flows with the MENA 2005-2017 (US$ millions) 
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Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT): Statistical Data (EVDS), 2018. 
 
Undoubtedly, Turkey-MENA FDI flows since the turn of the millennium have favoured the 
former and the long-term trend, despite the limitations witnessed in the past few years and the 
inconsistent annual FDI levels, demonstrates this. Turkey has had FDI surpluses with 10 states with its 
largest unsurprisingly being with hydrocarbon rich GCC states with large amounts of petro-dollars to 
invest. Since 2005, Turkey’s largest surplus is with the UAE (approximately $3.8 billion: $4.2 billion 
inflow and $381 million outflow), its second is with Saudi Arabia (just over $1.9 billion: $2 billion inflow 
and only $68 million outflow), its third is with Kuwait (approximately $1.592 billion: $1.7 billion inflow 
and only $32 million outflow), and its fourth is with Qatar ($1.589 billion: $1.621 billion inflow and 
only $32 million outflow). Meanwhile, Turkey’s largest FDI deficit is with Iraq (-$422 million) which is 
unsurprising given the lack of Iraqi investor power and the investment opportunities for 
reconstruction in Iraq since 2003. Turkey also has significant deficits with Egypt (-$225 million) and 
Tunisia ($-223 million) which have received modest Turkish FDI ($227 million and $223 million, 
respectively) but have sent virtually no FDI to Turkey over this period (Egyptian FDI totalled only $2 
million and Tunisia $0). Furthermore, the geographical spread of FDI inflows is relatively broad with 
states across the region investing in Turkey and receiving investments from Turkish sources, however, 
FDI flows are largely limited to the more prosperous (hydrocarbon rich and/or more industrialised) 
states and immediate neighbours. Turkey has been perhaps the most attractive MENA market for FDI 
from across the region over the past twenty years or so, which has helped to slightly re-position it as 
a key market in the broader regional economy. However, political uncertainty within Turkey and other 
MENA states, as well as structural economic vulnerabilities inherent within the regional economic 
system (chief among them: reliance on the export of hydrocarbons and the rentierism that is prevalent 
in most states (whether resource rich or poor)) may restrict further economic integration. Turkey’s 
integration into regional capital flows appears to have reached its ceiling.   
 
Table 4. Turkey’s Total FDI Flows with MENA States, 1990-2016 (US$ millions) 
  
FDI Inflows FDI Outflows FDI Total FDI Balance 
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Algeria 0 105 105 -105 
Bahrain 484 183 667 301 
Egypt 2 227 229 -225 
Iran 103 155 258 -52 
Iraq 11 433 444 -422 
Israel 395 12 407 383 
Jordan 216 7 223 209 
Kuwait 1648 56 1704 1592 
Lebanon 1280 28 1308 1252 
Libya 98 36 134 62 
Mauritania 0 0 0 0 
Morocco 0 87 87 -87 
Oman 0 0 0 0 
Qatar 1621 32 1653 1589 
Saudi Arabia 1964 68 2032 1896 
Sudan 0 12 12 -12 
Syria 11 17 28 -6 
Tunisia 0 223 223 -223 
UAE 4206 381 4587 3825 
Yemen 0 0 0 0 
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT): Statistical Data (EVDS), 2018. 
 
Market Integration and Turkish Corporations  
Multi-national corporations (MNCs) play important roles in promoting and deepening economic 
integration between markets. They not only take part in processes of production, exchange and 
consumption, but also increase the opportunity costs of defection from cooperative relations at the 
same time as they increase the rewards of continued engagement for both state and non-state actors. 
As discussed above, businesspersons engage in international projects, play significant roles in 
developing and maintaining inter-personal relationships and can help connect political decision-
makers together through both formal and informal channels as part of their transboundary activities. 
Trust can be built in the private sector perhaps more easily than in the governmental sector, and on a 
regular basis (perhaps even we could say daily) corporate actors engage with each other. Furthermore, 
corporations based in one state but operating in others reinforce shared interests that are best-served 
by cooperative and stable political relationships. Turkish corporations have been among the most 
active and successful of any MNCs in the MENA and a large number operate in numerous sectors 
across the region. Turkey’s ‘active political role [in the MENA has] encouraged Turkish private 
enterprise to invest in construction, oil, natural gas and telecommunication systems’ (Ehteshami and 
Elik 2011, 656-657) in a large number of states in the region. The roles MNCs play are not easily 
captured by macro-economic measure such as trade and FDI, so we will now turn to some specific 
examples.  
 Turkish corporations working in the construction sector have been highly successful since the 
early 2000s. Much of this work has been commissioned by national governments, has involved large-
scale infrastructure projects, and has been related to important and politically sensitive issues such as 
energy security, resource security, social welfare, and defence. In Algeria, for example, KAYI 
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Construction and its subsidiary Bilyap Construction, ENKA Insaat, Rönesans Holding (Rönesans 2018), 
and Yapi Merkezi have been very active. KAYI Construction and Bilyap Construction have completed a 
large number of projects including residential complexes, hotels, official administrative buildings, 
container terminals, retail centres, power plants, military infrastructure and educational institutions 
(Kayi 2018). ENKA Insaat (ENKA 2018) has been involved in the building of dams and water treatment 
infrastructure, while Yapi Merzeki (Yapi 2018) constructed the Bir Touta-Zeralda Railway and Sidi Bel 
Abbes tramway. In Iraq, KAYI Construction has been involved in building and restoring power 
generation infrastructure, hydrocarbons processing and transport facilities, and healthcare centres 
among other projects. ENKA Insaat has also been involved in building power plants and hydrocarbon 
pumping infrastructure in Iraq as well as marine works (mostly in Basra). As a measure of their 
competitiveness, many Turkish corporations not only operate in neighbouring countries but across 
the region. For example, TAV Construction (TAV 2018) has been involved in numerous airport and 
aviation infrastructure projects in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and the 
UAE since it was founded in 1997.  
 
Conclusions 
Regardless of the internal processes shaping its domestic politics, Turkey’s economic integration with 
the MENA looks set to deepen, largely due to the increasing levels of trade in goods and services, and 
the agency of Turkey’s private sector actors and the links they have established with the broader 
MENA market. Coupled with the structural changes most clearly manifest in commercial institutions, 
Turkey has become a more central component of the MENA system than at any time in the post-World 
War One era. The MENA has become an important market for Turkish exports and imports, and a 
source of FDI, which have combined to further strengthen growth in the Turkish economy. The overall 
trade and FDI surpluses that Turkey has experienced vis-à-vis the MENA since the early 2000s have 
helped to offset some of the less advantageous economic relationships it has experienced with 
European, North American and Asian states. Growth in bilateral trade with MENA states, in particular, 
has been very strong and although there have been some negative effects of the instability felt in 
some post-Arab Spring states and within Turkey itself, growth looks set to continue in the coming 
decade. Turkey is a trading state and the neoliberal economic reforms begun in the 1980s have 
become entrenched (even though political liberalisation has taken steps backwards) leading to 
Turkey’s economic growth relying on Ankara diversifying its foreign markets and developing economic 
relations with MENA states as well as other countries around the world.  
 Economic integration with the MENA and its potential spill-over effects into political, security 
and socio-cultural relationships may face some limitations, however. The rather mixed record of 
Turkey-MENA FDI and the apparent limitations on the expansion of capital flows across the region 
suggest that investors in Turkey and other MENA states do not have absolute trust and interest in 
each other’s markets. Political instability, the lack of profitable opportunities to invest and political 
restrictions will continue to hinder this important aspect of economic integration in the coming years. 
Without expanding economic links through FDI, Turkey’s role in the MENA market can continue to 
grow, but this role will be limited to processes of production, exchange and consumption. These 
processes, ultimately, will integrate Turkey further into the region but will not likely allow Turkey to 
become the centre of the MENA economy. Furthermore, increased trade will most likely go some way 
to promoting political cooperation between Turkey and other MENA states over time but is unlikely 
to lead to the type of economic interdependence that promotes regional security. If Ankara aspires to 
greater regional leadership, or even hegemony, then it will have to facilitate FDI further and promote 
Turkish private sector actors as they engage more in the regional market.  
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